Uitspraak
RECHTBANK DEN HAAG
uitspraak van de meervoudige kamer in de zaken tussen
[eiser] , geboren op [geboortedag] 1986, eiser,
de staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid, verweerder
Procesverloop
Overwegingen
49. The Court further notes that it has previously examined cases in which it was alleged that a removal to Italy under the Dublin Regulations would be in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. In its Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Tarakhel it held, when applying the above principles, that in view of the situation as regards the reception system in Italy pertaining at that material time, and as the case concerned children in respect of whom the requirement of “special protection” of asylum-seekers was particularly important in view of their specific needs and their extreme vulnerability, it was incumbent on the transferring State to obtain assurances from their Italian counterparts that upon their arrival in Italy, the persons concerned would be received in facilities and in conditions adapted to the age of the children, and that the family would be kept together (see Tarakhel, cited above, §§ 118-20).
50. From 8 June 2015 onwards, such assurances were provided by the Italian authorities by means of a general guarantee set out in circular letters (see paragraphs 24 and 26 above). In a number of cases, in which the Italian authorities had been duly informed by the authorities of the transferring State about the family situation and the scheduled arrival of the persons to be returned to Italy, the Court considered that that general guarantee was sufficient, since it entailed that the persons at issue would be placed in one of the SPRAR reception facilities in Italy which had been earmarked for families with minor children (see, amongst others, J.A. and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 21459/14, § 30, 3 November 2015; S.M.H. v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 5868/13, § 50, 17 May 2016; F.M. and Others v. Denmark (dec.), no. 20159/16, § 28, 13 September 2016; and Ali and Others v. Switzerland and Italy (dec.), no. 30474/14, § 34, 6 October 2016).
51. The applicant in the present case contended that no such reliance should be placed on the circular letter of 8 January 2019, since as a result of the amendments introduced to the reception system in Italy in 2018, applicants for international protection were no longer eligible for accommodation in the second-tier reception facilities of the SPRAR network, which had been renamed SIPROIMI (see paragraph 44 above).
52. The Court reiterates its established case-law to the effect that if an applicant has not yet been removed, the material point in time for the assessment of the claimed Article 3 risk is that of the Court’s consideration of the case. Given that it is the present conditions which are decisive, the Court will make a full and ex nunc evaluation where it is necessary to take into account information that has come to light after the final decision by the domestic authorities was taken (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, §§ 86 and 97, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V, and F.G. v. Sweden [GC], no. 43611/11, § 115, 23 March 2016, with further references).
53. It notes in that context that the latest modifications to the Italian system of reception of applicants for international protection took effect on 22 October 2020 and that these entailed, inter alia, that applicants for international protection would once more, within the limits of places available, have access to the second-tier reception facilities within the SAI (former SIPROIMI) network (see paragraphs 32-33, 36 and 47 above); a modification welcomed by UNHCR (see paragraph 37 above).
(…)”
- onder verwijzing naar Tarakhel– heeft opgedragen nadere feiten en omstandigheden over de omstandigheden waaronder bijzonder kwetsbare vreemdelingen werden opgevangen te verschaffen. Ten tijde van de bestreden besluiten was de feitelijke situatie van de opvanglocaties waarin eisers na een mogelijke overdracht zouden worden opgevangen onvoldoende duidelijk. De rechtbank heeft reeds eerder overwogen dat het in de specifieke situatie van Dublin-overdrachten aan Italië, waarbij in de jurisprudentie van het EHRM en van de Afdeling aanvaard was dat met de circulair letter was voldaan aan het bieden van individuele garanties dat de opvang voldeed aan de daaraan te stellen eisen, het aan verweerder was om nader te onderbouwen dat na het Salvini-decreet de opvang ook in overeenstemming was met de eisen die het EHRM heeft gesteld waarbij de laatste circular letter niet als een toereikende garantie was beoordeeld. Nu verweerder daartoe niet bereid is geweest en niet heeft onderbouwd dat ten tijde van de bestreden besluiten de algemene opvanglocaties en voorzieningen adequaat waren voor eisers als zij op dat moment op grond van de Dublinverordening zouden worden overgedragen, zal de rechtbank de bestreden besluiten vernietigen.
Beslissing
- verklaart de beroepen gegrond;
- vernietigt de bestreden besluiten;
- bepaalt dat de rechtsgevolgen van de bestreden besluiten in stand blijven;
- veroordeelt verweerder in de proceskosten van eisers tot een bedrag van € 1.335,00.