Conclusie
III.2 The 4th ground of appeal in cassation (marginal numbers 81 - 87)
VI.5 The 12th ground of appeal in cassation (marginal numbers 174 - 180)
VI.8 The 15th ground of appeal in cassation (marginal 194 - 213)
VI.9 The 16th ground of appeal in cassation (marginal numbers 214 - 234)
VI.10 The 18th ground of appeal in cassation (marginal numbers 235 - 245)
VI.11 The 19th ground of appeal in cassation (marginal numbers 246 - 252)
VI.12 The 20th ground of appeal in cassation (marginal numbers 253 - 258)
VI.13 The 21st ground of appeal in cassation (marginal numbers 259 - 266)
I. Introduction
Counts 1, 2 and 3 - The war crimes- at 1A, 2A and 3A, all being further alternative charges and in each case: ‘Complicity in co-committing violations of the laws and customs of war, while the offence results in death or involves rape, committed multiple times’;
Counts 4 and 5 - The breaches of the Sanctions Act 1977- at 4: ‘Co-committing deliberate violations of a regulation laid down in article 2 ICW article 3 of the Sanctions Act 1977, committed multiple times’”; and
- at 5: ‘Co-committing deliberate violations of a regulation laid down in article 2 of the Sanctions Act 1977, committed multiple times’.
L. Considerations regarding the evidence for the defendant’s involvement in the war crimes.
(“the soldiers had to complete the mission and (…..) promised that they could keep everything that they would find afterwards”).’
Antarctic Mariner, the vessel owned by [D] (referred to in the case documents as AM), through the port of Buchanan. Not only was this active involvement in the importation of arms one of the main reasons for holding that the defendant had aided and abetted the joint perpetration of war crimes, but it was also the basis for his criminal conviction for having perpetrated intentional violations of the UN arms embargoes. As regards the delivery of arms and ammunition by the
Antarctic Mariner, the Court of Appeal held as follows in the appealed judgment at H.4 (footnotes omitted):
H.4 Delivery of weapons and ammunition by the [ship 1]
Antarctic Marinerwas available to the defendant and his companies, and that this vessel was moored in the port of Buchanan a number of times each year. However, that the vessel was used to import arms, that the defendant played an active role in importing them and, for example, was present in the port and carried out inspections and that staff of [D] and [C] had been sent to the front with his knowledge and approval, which has always been denied by the defence, can only really be concluded from the witness statements referred to above. It has been noted more generally in the literature that often little evidence other than witness testimony is available in criminal cases involving international war crimes, [9] while in precisely this type of case it is difficult to assess the reliability of the witness testimony. [10] This has been no different in the present case. The criminal proceedings have throughout revolved mainly around one question: whether or not the incriminating witness statements are sufficiently reliable to serve as proof of such serious accusations. The ′s-Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal found with regard to the reliability of the witness testimony that it had ‘no reason whatsoever to doubt the accuracy and reliability of [witness] statements, as far as used for the judicial finding of fact.’ The Hague Court of Appeal, by contrast, viewed the same evidence as an ‘irreconcilable impediment’ to forming a conclusive opinion since ‘it would not be appropriate to disregard anything that these witnesses stated which was inconsistent, impossible or in any other way hardly likely, and to carefully select odds and ends that might support the finding of fact.'.
30th ground of appealin cassation raises various issues with the Court of Appeal’s finding (and the reasons given for it) that the granting of amnesty to the defendant in Liberia did not prevent the admissibility of his prosecution in the Netherlands by the Public Prosecution Service.
outrightin all circumstances. On the other hand, the view that not all amnesty arrangements can be justified has broad support. For example, self-amnesty adopted by a regime seeking to evade future criminal prosecution shortly before a change of power would be hard to justify. This notion seems to have been reflected by the Court of Appeal in the present case, where it explicitly notes that the amnesty scheme referred to in the ground of appeal did not come about in the course of a peace process, but was drawn up by the then government of Charles Taylor, under whose rule the offences occurred, shortly before his more or less forced departure from Liberia.
subsequentlynullifies the criminal liability. [34] A supplementary system-based argument for the position that amnesty is separate here from the double criminality of the offence can be derived from the state of the law on legal assistance. Although double criminality admittedly has a somewhat different function in relation to the rules on jurisdiction and its content is therefore not identical, it nevertheless seems important to me that under the law on extradition and surrender amnesty is a separate ground for refusal, together with the absence of double criminality. Article 3 (1) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between member states and article 4 of the Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition both contain a provision making it mandatory to refuse surrender or extradition if an amnesty has been declared in the member state of execution or the requested state, as the case may be. If amnesty were to mean an absence of double criminality, there would be no need for the Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition to provide specifically for amnesty to be a ground for refusal, since article 2 of that Convention requires double criminality. [35] The Framework Decision attaches importance to the distinction between ‘list offences’, for which the member state of execution is not permitted to verify the existence of double criminality, and ‘non-list offences’, for which surrender may be made dependent on double criminality. [36] This system is based on the principle of mutual recognition between the EU member states. If amnesty were to be regarded as a legal concept that undermines the double criminality of the offence, it would be a poor fit with this system since it is a - mandatory - ground for refusal. [37] As article 3 (1) of Framework Decision 2002/584 /JHA nonetheless makes it mandatory to refuse surrender on account of an amnesty arrangement, this suggests that amnesty should be regarded not as a category of case in which (double) criminality is absent, but rather as an independent decision of the state concerned in respect of the criminal proceedings against the person claimed. As such, the decision is, in principle, also entitled to recognition from the other member states. [38] I conclude from this that, even in a European context, decisions to grant amnesty, which are often of a political nature, are also not treated for the purposes of legal assistance as a circumstance removing the double criminality of the offence. In my view, it must therefore be assumed that the granting of an amnesty by a foreign state in whose territory an offence has been committed does not mean that the offence is not punishable under the law of that state within the meaning of article 5, paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code and article 7, paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code.
:
opinio iurisin the international community that international crimes should be punished, could be conceptualized as follows. Subject to what has been said above with regard to terrorism and what is stated below with regard to genocide and crimes against humanity, there is not yet any general obligation for states to refrain from enacting amnesty laws on these crimes. Consequently, if a state passes any such law, it does not breach a customary rule. Nonetheless, if the courts of another state having in custody persons accused of international crimes decide to prosecute them, although in their national state they would benefit from an amnesty law, such courts would not act contrary to general international law, in particular to the principle of respect for the sovereign prerogatives of other states.’ [48]
Ould Dah v. France,because - like the present case - it involved the prosecution, in a state which is party to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), of a defendant covered by an amnesty scheme in the country where the offences were committed. The applicant had been an officer in the Mauritanian army and was convicted by a French criminal court, exercising universal jurisdiction, for his part in acts of torture committed in that capacity. Ould Dah was sentenced in France to ten years’ imprisonment, although he was covered in his own country by an amnesty law enacted in 1993. He complained to the ECtHR of a breach of article 7 ECHR and submitted that he was entitled to invoke in France the amnesty that had been granted to him in Mauritania. The ECtHR viewed the matter differently. It reasoned, first, that torture should not go unpunished and that there are international obligations to prosecute and punish that crime. It then went on to examine the extraterritorial effect of amnesty:
ne bis in idemprinciple to the judgments of foreign criminal courts. It does so – since many years – in a rather far-reaching way [56] A foreign criminal judgment that can be equated under Dutch law with an acquittal, a discharge from prosecution on a point of law, a judicial pardon or a conviction followed by the full execution of the penalty, a pardon or debarring of the execution of the penalty due to expiry of the period of limitation prevents prosecution of the defendant in the Netherlands, regardless of the country in which or the regime under which the judgment was given. [57] Similarly, [58] article 54 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA) provides that a person whose trial has been finally disposed of in one Contracting Party may not be prosecuted in another Contracting Party for the same acts provided that, if a penalty has been imposed, it has been enforced, is actually in the process of being enforced or can no longer be enforced under the laws of the sentencing Contracting Party. The question whether an amnesty scheme constitutes a circumstance preventing enforcement of a penalty under the laws of the sentencing Contracting Party admits of various answers. A case can be made for answering this question in the affirmative. [59] Furthermore, in my view, the possibility cannot be entirely excluded that an amnesty granted abroad must, in certain circumstances, be treated as equivalent to the granting of a pardon for the purposes of article 68, paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code. However, the present case is not one in which a conviction has not been enforced (or not fully enforced) as a consequence of an amnesty. After all, criminal proceedings were never instituted in Liberia. I see no reason to equate the amnesty with an acquittal, a discharge from prosecution on a point of law or a judicial pardon. Nor, therefore, does article 68, paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code prevent the prosecution of a defendant who has been granted an amnesty abroad, provided in any event that he has not also already been tried in that country.
ex proprio motu.