Uitspraak
DISTRICT COURT OF THE HAGUE
1.Introduction
theIslam - or at least,
theirIslam. The defence also argued in a variety of ways that this trial is tantamount to criminalizing a religious persuasion. Not the accused’s acts, but their range of ideas is prosecuted and tried, the defence argued. They also asserted that any potentially unwelcome statements made by the accused were entirely or at least in large part protected by the right of freedom of speech to which the accused are entitled like everyone else. These accusations have prompted the court to start this judgment with some general considerations on the freedom of thought and opinion, the freedom of religion and personal beliefs, and the freedom of expression.
- i) gathering to study the Qur’an, or gaining a more in-depth knowledge of the Islam or certain denominations within the Islam, including Salafism;
- ii) doing Da’wah - Da’wah is an invitation to Islam -, whether in enclosed spaces, in the streets or on the Internet;
- iii) organizing and participating in demonstrations, whether they draw attention to the position of Muslim detainees or protest against the suppression of the Syrian population by Assad, against the screening of a film or proposed measures concerning the wearing of face-covering clothing;
- iv) collecting money or goods for humanitarian assistance to victims of the violence in Syria;
- v) protesting against the foreign policy of the western world or of the Netherlands, whether concerning Syria, Israel or Palestine and whether in the traditional media, social media or by means of demonstrations;
- vi) similarly campaigning against democracy as a form of government and criticizing the way in which this is given shape in the Netherlands;
- vii) openly sympathizing with the objects and actions of terrorist organizations such as IS and al-Qaeda, also if this is done through biased web pages.
2.The charges
3.Jurisdiction
NJ2009, 108), found explicitly that there was no provision opposing the assigning of retroactive force to a jurisdiction provision regarding the prosecution of genocide in the International Crimes Act. Subsequently, the legislator, with retroactive force, expanded the jurisdiction in this Act for the prosecution of genocide. [6] In the explanatory memorandum to the bill that led to this amendment of the International Crimes Act the Minister of Justice did emphasize that, generally, restraint should be exercised in assigning retroactive force to a regulation changing the jurisdiction rules [7] , and in answer to a parliamentary question if this is desirable only in very exceptional circumstances [8] he said that whether there are exceptional circumstances justifying the conferral of jurisdiction with retroactive effect should be looked at on a case-by-case basis.
alienswho have domicile or residence in the Netherlands and who commit a number of crimes abroad specified later on in this article, which include terrorist crimes. Strangely however, there was no such provision for people possessing Dutch nationality. The jurisdiction with regard to crimes committed abroad by
Dutchnationals was provided for in (the former) article 5 DCC. It provided that Dutch criminal law was only applicable if the offence that is considered punishable pursuant to Dutch criminal law was also punishable in the country in which it was committed, with the exception of the crimes listed in the article to which the requirement of double criminality did not apply. These did not include terrorist crimes. Important in this connection is also (the former) article 4 DCC, which declared Dutch criminal law applicable to
anyonewho committed,
inter alia, certain terrorist crimes abroad, but only if ‘either the offence is committed against a Dutch national, or the suspect is in the Netherlands’ [12] or in the case of terrorist crimes which were aimed, summarily put, at the Netherlands. [13] Therefore, the court concludes that under the old rules Dutch criminal law was applicable to aliens residing in the Netherlands who committed a terrorist crime abroad that is not directly aimed against the Netherlands, but was not applicable to Dutch nationals who committed such a crime abroad, except, of course, it was demonstrated that the crime is also punishable in the country where it was committed (which will usually be the case).
4.The investigation
5.Investigation on the Internet (Facebook and Twitter)
ex officioin the case against Hatim R.
observationas an investigative method (pursuant to art. 126q DCCP) [29] previous decisions of the Supreme Court have shown that for an answer to the question whether that method constituted a limited infringement of the accused’s privacy, the following circumstances are leading: the duration, intensity, places of surveillance, purpose of the surveillance, the way in which observation was conducted (the nuisance in the sense of how probing it was) and -with respect to the question whether continuation of the surveillance is justified- the extent of the suspicion entertained. It is important whether the method is suitable to get a more or less complete insight into certain aspects of the private life of the person involved. [30]
systematic gathering of informationas an investigative method (art. 126j DCCP) [33] :
- a) the interest protected by the rule breached,
- b) the seriousness of the breach, with regard to the circumstances in which the breach was committed and the degree of culpability of the breach and
- c) the harm that is caused by it.
- a) the accused suffered actual disadvantage,
- b) this disadvantage was caused by the breach,
- c) the disadvantage can be compensated by reduction of sentence, and
- d) reduction of sentence is justified in light of the interest of the breach and the seriousness of the default.
- a) through the actions or omissions of the police it can no longer be established whether the utterances (on social media) that Azzedine C. is charged with, did not derive from the police, or more particularly from the Facebook pages in the name of Aboe Noewas and Ab Bashir (and, therefore, if this constituted provocation);
- b) Aboe Noewas and Ab Bashir have committed the offence of incitement, without a legal basis;
- c) the Public Prosecution Service have not given full disclosure about the actions of Aboe Noewas and Ab Bashir;
- d) The Public Prosecution Service has lost part of the relevant documents about the Facebook pages of Aboe Noewas and Ab Bashir, or at least refuses to produce them.
5.37 With regard to what is set out under (a) the court finds as follows. The court construes the defence in such a way that the defence argues that the obligation to report has been violated.
With regard to the Facebook page of Aboe Noewas it must be established that the police can not (any longer) retrieve all messages posted on the page; only a part has been inserted in the case file. This constitutes a breach of procedural rules, which breach is irreparable. The information inserted in the case file on Ab Bashir is incomplete. This also constitutes an irreparable breach of procedural rules.
inter alia, the jihadi armed groups in earlier reports. The August 2013, 12 May 2014 and 1 August 2014 editions of Doctor Jolen’s expert reports, based on public sources, also presented this clearly. It must have been absolutely clear well before mid-2014 to anyone who followed the news about Syria to some extent and did not close his eyes to it, that the jihadi militias, systematically and on a large scale, committed serious crimes. The court does endorse that the videos that have been distributed since the end of August 2014 of beheadings of western journalists and the news about the imminent genocide of the Yezidis around that same time have contributed considerably to the knowledge amongst larger parts of the population of the ideology and acts of IS.
7.Applicable law
Boskoski & Tarculovskithe International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter: ICTY) summed up the relevant factors that had been established in case-law until then in order to be able to test the requirements of ‘intensity’ and ‘organization’. [56] In order to assess the intensity of the violence, the following aspects should be taken into consideration: the number of civilians fled, the type of weapons used (particularly military weapons and vehicles such as tanks), the numbers of casualties and of fighters, the calling of a truce, if any, and interference by the international community. In order to assess whether a party to the conflict meets the requirement of organization what should be looked at are a group’s command structure, the organization of operations, the disciplinary system, the possibility to implement the minimum standards of behaviour of international humanitarian law and the possibility to speak with one voice. [57]
Tadićthe ICTY established that there should exist ‘overall control’ over the organized armed group, in the sense that the other state “has a role in organising, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing operational support to that group”. [59] The criterion of ’overall control’ has been widely adopted in case-law. However, it turns out from state practice that “the overall control threshold is high and the evidence in support must be compelling”. [60]
becominginternationalized. The competition among regional powers for influence has resulted, among other consequences, in alarming exacerbation of the sectarian dimension, instigated by the intervention of foreign fighters and extremist clerics. [62]
internationalarmed conflicts a distinction is made between combatants and civilians. Only combatants enjoy the combatant’s privilege, i.e. the right to direct participation in hostilities and, therefore, the right to kill the enemy, take prisoners of war and destroy military objects. Combatants are obliged to observe the rules of international humanitarian law and, as long as they do, enjoy immunity from prosecution under domestic law. [66]
non-internationalarmed conflicts a distinction is made only between persons directly participating in the hostilities and civilians. In non-international armed conflicts combatant status does not exist. During the negotiations for the Geneva Conventions the contracting parties did not want to grant the combatant’s privilege to the members of organized armed groups that they had come into conflict with, or that had engaged in conflict within their territory. This would grant these members the right to legitimately participate in the hostilities. However, states were not prepared to grant immunity from prosecution to members of organized armed groups for taking up arms in order to prevent civilians from taking the law into their own hands. Therefore, members of organized armed groups are punishable for all acts of violence they commit, both for general crimes such as murder and for violations of international humanitarian law.
inter alia, to adapt domestic criminal law with regard to combating terrorism. [71] The Netherlands implemented this by introducing the Act on Terrorist Crimes. [72] Various (underlying) crimes with which the accused have been charged with, constitute terrorist crimes. These crimes are the implementation of the legislation referred to in the Framework Decision. [73]
contra legem. In this regard the prosecution adopts the position that the exception in recital 11 does not impose the obligation to exclude acts of war from provisions on terrorism, but only provides that the obligations under the Framework Decision do not apply to such acts. This does not entail an obligation - or at least this is how the court construes their point of view - to exclude the application of criminal law.
Kesbirjudgment that during non-international armed conflict various legal regimes may exist side by side does not say anything about the definition of terrorism during such conflicts. [74] During armed conflicts attacks against the population are always punishable, but actions aimed at a despicable regime are, specifically, not. The accused wanted to oust Assad’s regime, some wanted to found an Islamic state as well, but they never wanted to instil terror in the population. The recital in the preamble has been included in order to prevent misunderstandings and avoid conflicts between legal regimes. Allegedly, the General Court in Luxembourg ruled in the
LTTEjudgment that the applicability of Union law relating to terrorism is not excluded in the event of an armed conflict. [75] However, according to the defence the General Court has not expressed an opinion on the question what the scope of the preamble must be when interpreting the Framework Decision or the Dutch legislation based upon it. The
LTTEcase was about a regulation that was not based on the Framework Decision and a Common Position that did not contain an ‘exclusion clause’ as in the preamble. The defence pleads for dismissal as the terrorist elements of the charges may be proved, but not qualified.
of a State’ the question arises whether ‘armed forces’ in the first main clause also relates to other armed forces than those of a state. In order to determine the scope of the exclusion clause, the court will therefore have to establish the meaning of the term ‘armed forces’.
of a State’ has explicitly been included in the second main clause of this exclusion clause because this refers to peacetime actions. [83] From the involvement of the Netherlands in the formation of this exclusion clause and the acceptance of the same exclusion clause in the Framework Decision it can be inferred that the Dutch legislator was aware of this ambiguity and adopted a similar position with regard to the Framework Decision. [84] It thus seems that, in a literal sense, the exclusion clause does not relate to organized armed groups.
EU Law concerning terrorismto any acts of terrorism committed in that context”. [88]
8.Terrorist crimes
acountry, the illegitimate coercion of
agovernment (or international organization) or the disruption or destruction of the fundamental structures of
acountry (or international organization). The Act on Terrorist Crimes implements the Framework Decision in this respect, too. This obliges the member states of the European Union without reservation to penalize terrorist crimes, committed in any country and against any government whatsoever.
anycountry, including Syria, and
anygovernment or international organization, including the Syrian.
9.Other defences of inadmissibility
10.Views of the accused on the armed jihadi struggle in Syria
theman behind the website De Ware Religie (DWR). The expert Peters characterized DWR as a website which glorifies the armed jihadi struggle in Syria and demonstrates a clear sympathy for terrorist organizations such as IS and al-Qaida. [124] And on the FAQ page of DWR the question “What is your opinion of the mujahedeen who travelled to Syria?” is answered as follows: “They are our mujahedeen, who, different as they are, fight together for one purpose, side by side. May Allah see to it that they succeed, both here and in the hereafter?” Finally, the court points to the mail by DWR, i.e. Rudolph H., to NCTV of 20 June 2014, which contains the sentence: “We, of DeWareReligie.nl sympathize with the mujahedeen of al-Qaeda, the mujahedeen of Jabhat al-Nusra and the mujahedeen of the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham”. [125]
“pressing social need”,the assessment of which is to a certain degree at the discretion of the member states. In the assessment a balance must be achieved between the fundamental interest of the freedom of opinion (the individual civil right) and the fundamental interest of the protection of the democratic state (under the rule of law) (the fundamental social interest). An acceptable restriction of this freedom must at least meet the requirements of proportionality. Against this background the question to which extent the authorities are entitled to infringe on the fundamental right cannot be answered in a general sense, but will have to be decided by both the literal meaning of the communication or manifestation and the circumstances of the case. [138]
retweet is not endorsement. This entails that retweeting a message which in itself is considered inciting is, in principle, not punishable under article 131 DCC. This conduct does fall within the scope of article 132, however. This is different if it turns out from the accused’s comment to the retweet that he endorses its contents, or if the retweet fits in with a series of the accused’s messages of a similar nature and/or purport within a certain period. The same is true for sharing a hyperlink.
12.Incitement and dissemination of matter containing incitement, as charged
jihad fi sabil Allah(...)
tawhidflies all over the world, et cetera.
jihad fi sabil Allah, you need not worry.” Subsequently, he relates this to the present generation of fighters: “Those who are in Afghanistan, in Somalia, in Mali, you do not need to worry about them.”(...)
tawaghit. Woe to you who follows the palace scholars [Islamic scholars who adapt their interpretation of the religion to the interests and wishes of those in power who do not govern according to sharia]” (...)
mujahedeenwin, to have the flag of
tawhidfly all over the world, to open the eyes of young persons and let them die for
la illaha illalla[There is no god but God], to settle the score with enemies of Islam and to let ‘us’ follow in the footsteps of the
salaf[the pious companions] and the prophet.
la illaha illallah.
theIslamic radio station for Qur’an, lectures and anasheed”. [258] Oussama C. says, amongst other things:
dajjal) as well as the present day lifestyle of young persons and the perspective of other Muslims because itis not based on ‘true’ Islam. In the end, the eschatological Islamic traditions with their emphasis on life and death, martyrdom and behavioural change can carry many different meanings to individuals, depending on their own religious socialization, personal circumstances and ambitions. [274]
jihad fi sabil Allah(...)
tawhidflies all over the world, et cetera.
jihad fi sabil Allah, you need not worry.” Subsequently, he links this to the present generation of fighters: “Those who are in Afghanistan, in Somalia, in Mali, you do not need to worry about them.”(...)
tawaghit. Woe to you who follows the palace scholars [Islamic scholars who adapt their interpretation of the religion to the interests and wishes of those in power who do not govern according to sharia]” (...)
la illaha illalla[There is no god but God], to settle the score with enemies of Islam and to let ‘us’ follow in the footsteps of the
salaf[the pious companions] and the prophet. [278]
la illaha illallah.
[sic]the battlefield, I love it more then
[sic]when I am in my home
[sic]”. On 31 December 2013 Moussa L. posted a message. The message shows an image of a robust man with wearing a bandana with the Islamic creed and the text “join the jihad”. Moussa L. personally added the text “in shaa Allah” to the picture. [317] In view of the image of the apparent fighter, the inciting text and the addition by Moussa L., in combination with the Facebook page’s profile picture, the court holds that this message is a direct exhortation to participate in the armed jihadi struggle in Syria.
13.Recruitment for the armed struggle, the legal framework
14.Recruitment for armed struggle as stated in the charges(Oussama C. and Azzedine C.)
the military jihad (amongst other things, in 2013) with as its object to establish the rule and the laws of Allah, and that the club believed that Muslims all over the world are obliged to fight the jihad. De Koning called Azzedine C. clearly pro-ISIS.
15.Conspiracy, preparation and facilitation of and participation in training
for terrorist crimes, the legal framework
lex specialisvis-a-vis article 46 DCC.
16.Participation in training to commit terrorist crimes, as charged
- a) travelling to Mecca (Saudi Arabia) in order to prepare for the violent jihad and/or
- b) acquainting himself with the radical and extremist body of ideas of the armed jihadi struggle with terrorist intent and/or
- c) seeking information about travelling to the conflict area in Syria and/or
- d) taking part in a training camp for the armed jihadi struggle in Syria.
It turns out from the case file that Jordi de J. in October/November 2012 went on a hadj (pilgrimage) to, inter alia, Mecca and Medina (Saudi Arabia). Of course, participation in the hadj is not punishable. The case file does not contain any evidence that Jordi de J. prepared himself for the violent jihad during the hadj. The court therefore acquits Jordi de J. of this pat of the charges (leaving aside the fact that Saudi Arabia is not included in the charges as a place where the acts stated in the charges were allegedly committed).
The court construes the charge under b) to refer to the period preceding Jordi de J.’s departure to Syria. The court holds that acquainting oneself with a body of ideas presupposes that someone familiarizes himself with and endorses the fundamental and elementary constructs, ideas and principles of such a body of ideas in a certain period. It emerges from the case file that although Jordi de J. was confronted regularly with elements of a body of thoughts that could be called radical [425] in the period prior to his departure to Syria, particularly in conversations with fellow believers, this is insufficient, in view of what the court construes ‘acquainting oneself with the body of ideas’ to mean, the charges under b) legally and conclusively proved. Therefore the court acquits the accused of this charge as well. In light of this the court need not discuss whether acquainting oneself with the body of thought as referred to in the charges coincides with acquiring the knowledge to commit, prepare or facilitate acts of terrorism.
At the trial Jordi de J. stated that he discussed with his companion Subject no. 14 ‘how to get to Syria’ before he left for Syria. Furthermore, also at the trial, he stated to have been given a note by Subject no. 15 with a Syrian telephone number and a description of the ‘best‘ itinerary to Syria. Jordi de J. followed the itinerary described in the note and when he had arrived in southern Turkey he got in touch with the said telephone number, after which Jordi de J. together with Subject no. 14 was taken across the border between Turkey and Syria. [426]
At the trial Jordi de J. stated that upon his arrival in Syria he stayed in a villa near Bab Al-Hawa for two or three days, and that he was subsequently taken to a training camp in Sheikh Suleiman. In the camp lessons in ideology were given, but also ‘combat training’. Jordi de J. stated that he followed the lessons in ideology, but that he manages to withdraw from combat training by pretending an ankle injury. As he was unwilling to train and as a result was taken for a spy, he was transferred to another place after five, six days, where full-scale armed combat was raging, and he stayed there until his return to the Netherlands. While in Syria, Jordi de J. witnessed the burial of the Dutch fighter Subject no. 5. [432]
. trained [court’s emphasis]against his will, Witness no. 2 also stated. [433] Witness no. 2 also recognized Jordi de J.’s companion, Subject no. 14 (whom he knew as ‘Abu Mohamed’) in a picture. Subject no. 14 also stayed in the said training camp and received military training there as well, Witness no. 2 stated. [434]
AS: Uhm returned?
V1: Yes.
AS: Uhm Jordi de J..
V1: Did you ever talk to him about it?
AS: He did not talk uhm about the itinerary, but he did say how things are over there.
V1: OK. What did he tell you about it?
AS: He he told about the, how training camp is. Uhm he said more about uhm these difficulties. Whether in winter you, if you are in the mountains, that you have to sleep in a tent. Uhm, uhm, that you just don’t uhm receive good training and such. He never fo, he says that he never fought. He never ran uhm sorry he was never in the training camp.
V1: Mm, mm.
AS: And uhm he once told me uhm how things are when a bomb strikes, then uhm is a bomb with so many splinters coming out. And uhm well..
V1: What did he tell you about the training camps then?
AS: ...and uhm like uhm that you train enough. How you should shoot.
V1: Mm, mm.
AS: Uhm and uhm just a bit cool uhm, cool, uhm what’s it called, a bit, how do you call it? A body, no not the body, train physical fitness.
V1: Physical fitness.
AS: Just working out, learning how to shoot uhm yes, that kind of thing.
V2: Mm.
V1: And who provides the training then?
AS: He said a man from- and it was a Syrian man.
V1: Mm, mm.
AS: But of course he does not have a name. He said a Syrian man. Because he told me like uhm the, I had done something wrong and uhm that Syrian man called me names in Syrian. Like: how can you, did you speak to him if he were a Syrian and you are Dutch? He said, says he: someone from the camp translates.
V1: Are there translators? (...)
AS: Uhm, translators, yes.
V1: OK. But that camp, those camps are all in Syria?
AS: Yes, all in Syria.
V1: For how long has he been in such a camp?
AS: Uhm, he has been perhaps, lemme see, he had gone in May, or in February, sorry ....
V1: Mm, mm.
AS: ... he returned in the summer, or in May.
V1: And he spent all that time in one of those camps?
AS: Uhm he did. (...) [436] V2: What did he tell yo about where he slept for instance?
AS: Uhm in a refugee camp in a tent. And he did not like it. Uhm yes, just in tents. For as long as you are in a training camp, you are just in a, you sleep in a tent. And I also heard that if you participate in fighting you get money to pay the rent, get a loan. [437]
17.Conspiracy, preparation and facilitation of and participation in training
en routeto Syria. Although the court considers it very likely that Hatim R. also facilitated their setting off for Syria, this cannot be legally and conclusively proved due to the fact that the substance of these conversations is unavailable.
inter alios, Soufiane Z., Hicham el O., Anis Z. and Hatim R. were involved in bringing Subject no. 4, Subject no. 35 and Subject no. 5 into the conflict area from Syria. Subject no. 4, Subject no. 35 and Subject no. 5 subsequently participated in the armed jihadi struggle. Hatim R. also drafted a packing list intended to inform foreign fighters (to be) about which items to take when setting off for Syria.
inter alios, Anis Z., Hicham el O. and Hatim R. joined ISIS. Subsequently, in July 2013 - after a letter from al Zawahiri - they debated switching from ISIS to Jabhat al-Nusra. Following that,
inter alios, Anis Z. and Hicham el O. deliberately chose to switch over. [536] In doing so they agreed to commit with intent sufficiently specific terrorist crimes for that organization. Considering the hostilities they had committed before and the fact that they took their firearms with them to Jabhat al-Nusra, it can be established that this agreement was sufficiently intended and final. Thus it can be proved that they conspired to commit the offences of murder, manslaughter and causing an explosion, each with terrorist intent.
18.Participation in a criminal (terrorist) organisation
inter alios, Azzedine C., Rudolph H., Soufiane Z., Oussama C., Hatim R., Moussa L., Subject no. 1 and Subject no. 33 had befriended each other. They shared, liked and commented on each other’s posts on social media. [655] Azzedine C. and Soufiane Z. were also the administrators of the secret Facebook group Werkgroep Shaam, which was created on 7 April 2014. [656] Rudolph H., Hatim R. and Subject no. 33 were members of this group, on which the fitaan that had arisen in Shaam could be discussed and different opinions on it could be shared. [657]
pass comments, so that
they(we) can also put it online in the next few days. The court infers from this that they were also asked to review the contents, so that they Soufiane Z., Rudolph H. and Azzedine C. could subsequently put the film online in the next few days.
sic], a map of Greece-Albania/FYROM, a GARMIN satellite navigation device and 3,480 Euros. [772]
immediatepurpose. What the prosecution attempts to do, basically, is stretching this to include objects that ensue from this immediate purpose and are
further removed. For this reason, the court cannot follow the prosecution in this. From the accused persons’ joint and several actions, as established by the court, it cannot be inferred that the
immediatepurpose of the organization included the commission of these other crimes. [797]
- i) facilitating one or more meetings (at, inter alia, [the Address] and/or Hondius) where inciting and/or recruiting activities for the armed jihadi struggle in Syria occurred;
- ii) acting as a speaker or otherwise adopting an active, leading and/or determining role during meetings (at, inter alia Hondius and/or Frankies) where inciting and/or recruiting activities for the armed jihadi struggle in Syria occurred;
- iii) disseminating by word of mouth within or outside the group the views shared within the group about the armed jihadi struggle in Syria, which include recruiting people for that purpose and calling them to martyrdom;
- iv) administering websites and/or social media channels on which documents and/or audio and/or visual materials were posted of an inciting and/or recruiting nature;
- v) disseminating and or recommending, both within and outside the organization, (channels showing) documents and/or audio and/or visual materials of an inciting and/or recruiting nature;
- vi) commenting on and/or supplying information to and/or editing and/or making suggestions for the production of documents and/or audio and/or visual materials of an inciting and/or recruiting nature, and/or cooperate in it;
- vii) asking and/or granting permission for posting and/or using inciting and/or recruiting writings/documents and/or audio or visual materials;
- viii) physically showing inciting and/or recruiting writings/documents and/or audio or visual materials;
- ix) raising funds, in the shape of money and objects, for the benefit of (the participants in) the armed jihadi struggle in Syria;
- x) carrying and/or dividing and/or requesting funds, in the shape of money and objects, for the benefit of (the participants in) the armed jihadi struggle in Syria;
- xi) procuring information and/or opportunity, in the shape of SIM cards, contact information, telephone numbers and instructions, for the benefit of (bringing participants into the conflict area and/or having them join) the armed jihadi struggle in Syria.
19.Other charges Azzedine C.
groups of peoplefor the mere reason that its members (in so far as relevant in this case) belong to a race or practice a faith at which the criticism is directed.
20.Other charges Moussa L.
21.Facts proven, punishability of the offences and criminal liability
22.22. Sentencing considerations
24.The applicable sections of the law
25.Judgment - Imane B.
25.Judgment - Oussama C.
1 (ONE) YEAR,
is not executedon the general condition that the convict:
operational periodherewith set at
three years;
25.Judgment – Azzedine C.
25.Judgment - Rudolph H.
1 (ONE) YEAR,
is not executedon the general condition that the convict:
operational periodherewith set at three years;
25.Judgment - Jordi de J.
335 (THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE) DAYS;
180 (ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY) DAYS,
is not executedon the general condition that the convict:
operational periodherewith set at
three years;
25.Judgment - Moussa L.
103 (ONE HUNDRED AND THREE) DAYS;
60 (SIXTY) DAYS,
is not executedon the general condition that the convict:
operational periodherewith set at three years;
25.Judgment - Hicham el O.
- murder with terrorist intent;
- manslaughter, committed with terrorist intent and
- intentionally causing an explosion where general danger to property and serious bodily harm or danger to another person’s life might have been expected to ensue from the act, committed with terrorist intent;
- murder with terrorist intent;
- manslaughter, committed with terrorist intent;
- intentionally causing an explosion where general danger to property and serious bodily harm or danger to another person’s life might have been expected to ensue from the act, committed with terrorist intent;
- to procure for himself or others the opportunity, means or information to commit that crime;
- to have available items about which he knows that they are intended for the commission of that crime;
25.Judgment - Hatim R.
- murder with terrorist intent;
- manslaughter, committed with terrorist intent;
- intentionally causing an explosion where general danger to property and serious bodily harm or danger to another person’s life might have been expected to ensue from the act, committed with terrorist intent;
- to procure for himself or others the opportunity, means or information to commit that crime;
- to have available items about which he knows that they are intended for the commission of that crime;
25.Judgment - Anis Z.
- murder with terrorist intent;
- manslaughter, committed with terrorist intent and
- intentionally causing an explosion where general danger to property and serious bodily harm or danger to another person’s life might have been expected to ensue from the act, committed with terrorist intent;
- murder with terrorist intent;
- manslaughter, committed with terrorist intent;
- intentionally causing an explosion where general danger to property and serious bodily harm or danger to another person’s life might have been expected to ensue from the act, committed with terrorist intent;
- to procure for himself or others the opportunity, means or information to commit that crime;
- to have available items about which he knows that they are intended for the commission of that crime;
6 (SIX) YEARS.